Publications
Ontologies, Arguments, and Large-Language Models(with J. Beverley, H. Karray, D. Maxwell, C. Benson & B. Smith)
in Ítalo Oliveira (ed.), Joint Ontologies Workshop (JOWO), Twente, Netherlands: CEUR, pp. 1-9 (2024)
Abstract:
The explosion of interest in large language models (LLMs) has been accompanied by concerns over the extent to which generated outputs can be trusted, owing to the prevalence of bias, hallucinations, and so forth. Accordingly, there is a growing interest in knowledge representation (KR) tools – ontologies and knowledge graphs, in particular – to make LLMs more trustworthy. This rests on the long history of KR in constructing human-comprehensible justification for model outputs as well as traceability concerning the impact of evidence on other evidence. Understanding the nature of arguments and argumentation is critical to justification and traceability, especially when LLM output conflicts with what is expected by users. The central contribution of this article is to extend the Arguments Ontology (ARGO) – an ontology of terms and relations specific to the domain of argumentation and evidence broadly construed – into the space of LLM outputs in the interest of promoting justification and traceability. We outline a strategy for creating ARGO–based ‘blueprints’ to help LLM users explore justifications for outputs. We conclude by describing critical applications at the intersection of LLM and knowledge representation research.
On Whether It Is and What It Is
Acta Analytica 39(3): 467-478 (2024)
Abstract:
This dialogue, taking place between Prof. Whether and Prof. What, focuses on the nature of the relationship between ontology, conceived as the branch of philosophy concerned with the question of what entities exist, and metaphysics, conceived as the complementary part of philosophy that seeks to explain, of those entities, what they are. Most philosophers claim that it is not possible to address the first question without at the same time addressing the second, since knowing whether an entity exists requires knowing what that entity is. Prof. Whether argues against this popular position and offers a detailed analysis of the idea according to which it is possible to do ontology without engaging in metaphysics. Prof. Whether and Prof. What agree that, rather than being merely possible, in some cases it is, for methodological reasons, even preferable to start with a metaphysics-free ontology, postponing any inquiry concerning the nature of the entities included in the ontological inventory to a later stage. However, Prof. What notes that it is not always possible to do ontology without metaphysics, because there are certain kinds of entities, such as universals and possible worlds, that necessarily need a prior metaphysical characterization.
Social Kinds, Social Objects, and Vague Boundaries
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Ontology of Social, Legal and Economic Entities (SoLEE) (2021)
Abstract:
In this paper, I argue against what I call “natural realism” about social kinds, the view according to which social categories have natural boundaries, independent of our thought. First, I draw a distinction between two different types of entity realism, one being about the existence of the entity, “ontological realism”, and the other one being about the direct mind-independence of the entity, “natural realism”. After endorsing ontological realism, I present the natural realist argument according to which there would be certain social kinds, such as economic recessions and racism, even if we had no clue about their existence and nature. I claim that the argument fails insofar it mistakes the single instances for the kinds themselves. I then argue against natural realism by showing how the vagueness characterizing the boundaries of social kinds puts the realist in front of a dilemma: either she accepts the vagueness of these boundaries as ontic, a metaphysically problematic thesis, or she accepts that most or all social kinds remain unknown, an epistemologically problematic thesis. Thus, I argue that antirealism, according to which social kinds are constructed, is a better alternative to the realist account.
An Upper-Level Ontology for SNOMED CT based on OGMS
(with S. El-Sappegh, F. Ali & K.-S. Kwak)
BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 18(1): 1-19 (2018)
Abstract:
Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine—Clinical Terms (SNOMED CT, hereafter abbreviated SCT) is a comprehensive medical terminology used for standardizing the storage, retrieval, and exchange of electronic health data. Some efforts have been made to capture the contents of SCT as Web Ontology Language (OWL), but these efforts have been hampered by the size and complexity of SCT. Our proposal here is to develop an upper-level ontology and to use it as the basis for defining the terms in SCT in a way that will support quality assurance of SCT, for example, by allowing consistency checks of definitions and the identification and elimination of redundancies in the SCT vocabulary. Our proposed upper-level SCT ontology (SCTO) is based on the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS). The SCTO is implemented in OWL 2, to support automatic inference and consistency checking. The approach will allow integration of SCT data with data annotated using Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry ontologies, since the use of OGMS will ensure consistency with the Basic Formal Ontology, which is the top-level ontology of the OBO Foundry. Currently, the SCTO contains 304 classes, 28 properties, 2400 axioms, and 1555 annotations. It is publicly available through the bioportal at http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/SCTO/. The resulting ontology can enhance the semantics of clinical decision support systems and semantic interoperability among distributed electronic health records. In addition, the populated ontology can be used for the automation of mobile health applications.
L’identità diacronica fra ontologia e metafisica
Rivista di Filosofia Analitica Junior 5(2): 66-81 (2014)
Abstract:
In this paper, I tackle the problem of diachronic identity. Far from providing a criterion for identity over time, the aim of this work is to understand if this issue pertains to ontology, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to answer the question about what entities exist, or metaphysics, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to explain, of those entities, what they are. On the face of it, only metaphysics has the task to solve this problem, but I argue that this is false. Through the analysis of different theories concerning identity through time, I show how both ontology and metaphysics are concerned with the problem of diachronic identity, and how actually ontology turns out to be primary in solving the problem.
Under Review
(titles removed to preserve anonymity)
Paper on the metaphysics of artifacts and artworks (draft available upon request)
Paper on social kinds and realism (draft available upon request)
Work in Progress
(titles removed to preserve anonymity)
Paper on an ontology of arguments (draft available upon request)
Paper on realist views of social kinds and the ameliorative approach (draft in progress)
Paper on the definition of social (draft available upon request)
Paper on the definition of social kind and social group